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The Under-representation of Third World States in 





Among scholars researching the position of the Third World in the formation and application of 
customary international law (CIL), there is consensus that States belonging to this category are 
significantly under-represented in the process. The scholarly criticism surrounding this under-
representation is broadly organized along three lines of argument. Firstly, it is argued that the current 
CIL framework is undemocratic when it comes to the participation of the Third World. This lack of 
‘democratic legitimacy’ does not only concern customary rules formed in the colonial period, but also 
customary rules formed in the late 20th and 21st century. Secondly, it is argued that since customary 
rules develop from a general practice of international society, CIL reflects and crystalizes past realities 
and not proposed reforms. Thus, CIL is biased towards the status quo and is not conducive to changes 
in the international legal system. Thirdly, it is argued that the formation and application of CIL is 
disproportionally influenced by powerful developed States, often neglecting the role or interests of the 
Third World. This line of criticism identifies several mechanisms within the CIL framework which 
maintain the imbalance, including the dominance of first world practice when analysing the ‘State 
practice’ requirement, the development of the persistent objector doctrine, and the appropriation of the 
specially affected States doctrine by powerful States of the Global North. 
This paper explores the criticism towards CIL from the Third World perspective and examines whether 
the issues identified by scholars may be addressed through the identification, development, and 
application of uniform guidelines for the interpretation of CIL. In this sense, the paper examines how a 
consistent practice of CIL interpretation after the formation and identification of a CIL rule may offer 
an approach which addresses the lack of democratic legitimacy of CIL, CIL’s bias towards the status 
quo, and the dominance by powerful States in the formation and application of CIL. The paper thus 
argues that interpretation may offer an answer to these critiques by: i) enhancing uniformity in the 
application of CIL; ii) offering a solution to the critique of dominance by laying out uniform guidelines 
for the interpretation and application of CIL; and iii) providing an opportunity for CIL rules to evolve 
through the process of interpretation.  
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Among scholars researching the position of the Third World1 in the formation and application of 
customary international law (CIL), there is consensus that states belonging to this category are 
significantly under-represented in the process.2  In a recent paper on the topic, Galindo and Yip argue 
that “the current framework of CIL is based on an undemocratic law-making process, which has been 
shaped mostly by powerful States to the disadvantage of the interests of developing countries”.3 
 
1  It is relevant to point out that some scholars have criticized the category of “Third World” States, largely 
due to what they consider is its anachronistic nature. Nonetheless, it is maintained that for the purposes of 
the present discussion, the “Third World” category broadly encompasses the developing States of Latin 
America, Asia and Africa, and remains relevant when discussing the formation and operation of CIL. For a 
more detailed exploration of the Third World category see Joycelin C. Okubuiro, ‘Application of Hegemony 
to Customary International Law: An African Perspective’ [2018] 7 Journal of Comparative Law 232, 236.  
2  B. S. Chimni, ‘Customary International Law: A Third World Perspective’ [2018] 112(1) AJIL 1; Okubuiro 
(n1); George R. B. Gallindo and Cesar Yip, ‘Customary International Law and the Third World: Do Not 
Step on the Grass’ [2017] Chinese JIL 251; J Patrick Kelly, ‘Customary International Law in Historical 
Context: The Exercise of Power without General Acceptance’ in Brian D. Lepard (ed.) Reexamining 
Customary International Law (CUP 2017) 47; Anthea Roberts, ‘Traditional and Modern Approaches to 
Customary International Law: A Reconciliation’ [2001] 95 AJIL. 
3  Gallindo and Yip, supra note 2, at 252. 
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Moreover, “[d]espite being aware of this situation, the Third World has been unable to fundamentally 
question or change this scenario”.4  
The scholarly criticism of Third World States’ under-representation in CIL is broadly organized along 
three lines of argument. Firstly, it is argued that the current CIL framework is undemocratic when it 
comes to the participation of the Third World, because recently independent States have to comply with 
legal norms in whose creation they have had no say.5 Within this context, authors have pointed out a 
lack of ‘democratic legitimacy’ of CIL, evident in situations when a particular customary rule is formed 
without the participation of a significant number of States, and the interests and concerns of these States 
are neglected or ignored in the norm formation process.6 This criticism does not only concern customary 
rules formed in the colonial period, but also customary rules formed in the late 20th and 21st century.7 
Secondly, it is argued that since customary rules develop from a general practice of international society, 
CIL reflects and crystalizes past realities and not proposed reforms.8 In this argument, scholars have 
pointed out that due to its reliance on general state practice CIL is biased towards the status quo and is 
not conducive to changes in the international legal system.9 Thirdly, it is argued that the formation and 
application of CIL is disproportionally influenced by powerful developed States,10 often neglecting the 
role or interests of the Third World.11 This line of criticism identifies several mechanisms within the 
CIL framework which maintain the imbalance, including the dominance of first world practice when 
analysing the ‘state practice’ requirement,12 the development of the persistent objector doctrine,13 and 
the appropriation of the specially affected States doctrine by powerful States of the Global North.14 
This paper explores the criticism towards CIL from the Third World perspective and examines whether 
the issues identified by scholars may be addressed through the identification, development, and 
application of uniform guidelines for the interpretation of CIL. In this sense, the paper examines how a 
consistent practice of CIL interpretation after the formation and identification of a CIL rule may offer 
an approach which addresses the lack of democratic legitimacy of CIL, CIL’s bias towards the status 
quo, and the dominance by powerful States in the formation and application of CIL. The paper thus 
argues that interpretation may offer an answer to these critiques by: 
i) Enhancing uniformity in the application of CIL; 
ii) Offering a solution to the critique of dominance by laying out uniform guidelines for 
the interpretation and application of CIL; and  
iii) Providing an opportunity for CIL rules to evolve through the process of interpretation. 
The analysis is structured in three sections. Section one deals with the criticism towards CIL from the 
Third World perspective, and expands on the three main lines of criticism identified above. Section two 
then turns to the interpretation of CIL and explores how it can address the criticism identified in Section 
one. It does so by firstly dealing with the interpretation of CIL more generally, by reference to 
interpretation in the practice of international courts and the corresponding scholarly analysis. It then 
 
4  Ibid. 
5  Ibid, 254. 
6  Kelly, supra note 2, at 49. 
7  Ibid, 71; Okubuiro, supra note 2, at 258-262; Chimni, supra note 2, at 13, expanding on a similar observation 
made by H.E. Mohammed Bedjaoui in his seminal work “Toward a New International Economic Order”. 
8  Gallindo and Yip, supra note 2, at 254. 
9  Ibid. 
10  Roberts, supra note 2, at 768. 
11  Chimni, supra note 2; Okubuiro, supra note 2. 
12  Galindo and Yip, supra note 2; Chimni, supra note 2; Roberts, supra note 2. 
13  Chimni, supra note 2, at 6. 
14  Kevin John Heller, ‘Specially Affected States and the Formation of Custom’ [2018] 112(2) AJIL 191. 
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develops the argument that the criticism of the current system of CIL and its operation, developed from 
the Third World perspective, can be addressed with the development of uniform guidelines for CIL 
interpretation. Notably, this section forwards the view that uniform guidelines of interpretation carry 
the potential to democratize CIL, and provide the opportunity for customary rules to evolve through the 
process of interpretation. Finally, section three summarizes all the findings by way of conclusion. 
 
2. Criticism 
This section expands on the three lines of criticism levied against the current system of CIL from the 
perspective of Third World States. Before embarking on this analysis however, a small caveat is in 
order. With respect to the categories of criticism outlined above, it is important to note that this 
categorization does not represent a strict divide. Often the points raised by scholars relate to or even 
overlap with one another, and this will be duly recognized in the upcoming sections. The distinction 
offered in the paper is that of loose categorization and serves the purpose of laying out the current 
scholarly debate more clearly. 
 
2.1 The Current System of CIL is Undemocratic 
In a historical analysis of the development of CIL, J. Patrick Kelly persuasively illustrates the lack of 
democratic legitimacy of the current CIL system. Kelly defines democratic legitimacy as “the extent to 
which nations and societies are members of, participate in, and influence the political community 
determining norms”.15 In the context of CIL however, historically the practice and interests of non-
Western nations and societies, as well as less powerful Western nations, were largely neglected or not 
considered for the purposes of CIL creation and identification.16 This practice of exclusion continued 
in the post-colonial period as well, and has led nations such as Japan, Argentina and China to view 
themselves as recipients of international law rather than participants in the process.17  
CIL’s lack of democratic legitimacy comes from several aspects of the current CIL system. Primarily, 
and most explicitly, it stems from the fact that recently independent States were and continue to be 
bound by CIL rules in whose creation they did not participate. As a result, customary rules are biased 
in geographic, religious, economic, and political terms.18 Early debates on this problem in CIL 
questioned whether new States were in fact bound by existing CIL.19 This question was resolved by the 
project of the International Law Association (ILA) on the formation of customary international law, 
where in the commentary to Principle 14 it was found that “newly-independent States or those new to 
a particular activity are bound by existing rules of customary law”.20 While some authors have since 
 
15  Kelly, supra note 2, at 49.  
16  Ibid.  
17  See indicatively Hanqin Xue ‘Chinese Observations on International Law’ [2007] CJIL 83(6) 84-85. 
18  Gallindo and Yip, supra note 2, at 254. 
19  Francisco Orrega Vicuña ‘Customary International Law in a Global Community: Tailor Made?’ [2005] 
Estudios Internacionales No. 148, Instituto de Estudios Internacionales Universidad de Chile 21. 
20  International Law Association, London Conference ‘Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of 
General Customary International Law’ [2000] 24. 
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contended that this is no longer an active debate,21 many continue to raise this point to illustrate CIL’s 
undemocratic character.22  
The historical lack of democratic legitimacy indigenous to the current CIL system has led some authors 
to develop an ever more elaborate critique of CIL’s undemocratic character which argues that the 
current CIL system is a form of hegemonic oppression. When found in scholarly work, the hegemony 
critique is most often based on Antonio Gramsci’s notion of hegemony which equates hegemony with 
domination, and argues that it arises when the interests of the dominant few are presented as if they are 
universal.23 Consequently, a social order which produces and reproduces the ideology of the dominant 
few is maintained through a network of institutions, social relations and ideas.24 Extended to the 
international sphere and CIL, this argument maintains that powerful States do not sustain their 
domination in the international system through the exclusive use of power but also through the force of 
ideas and beliefs that come to be internalized by the subjects of domination.25 In the context of CIL this 
critique targets the claim that CIL reflects universal values,26 and its more historic counterpart which 
claims that CIL is based on common consent.27 
One examples which aptly illustrates the issues raised by this line of criticism comes from the 
development of the international minimum standard of compensation for the expropriation of foreign 
property. In a historical analysis of the development of the standard, Kelly persuasively demonstrates 
that the standard was both developed from a decidedly Eurocentric body of scholarship, and pushed to 
universalization in spite of explicit opposition by Latin American States which had developed 
alternative regional doctrines.28 One such regional approach was the Calvo doctrine, developed by the 
eponymous Argentine jurist. The Calvo doctrine maintained that foreign investors should settle disputes 
arising out of the investment under the national law of the home state, and that aliens are not entitled to 
rights and privileges not accorded to nationals.29 This approach precluded the application of any 
international minimum standard of full compensation.30 Furthermore, many Latin American States 
inserted so called Calvo clauses in their domestic statutes and constitutions,31 thereby reiterating their 
stand on the matter. Nevertheless, this practice of Latin American States was largely neglected by their 
American and European counterparts and was not considered in arbitral cases of the time.32   
 
2.2 CIL Reflects Past Realities 
The second category of criticism revolves around the claim that CIL reflects and crystalizes past realities 
rather than opportunities to reform the international legal system. This line of criticism tends to be two-
 
21  Vicuña, supra note 21, at 27. 
22  Kelly, supra note 2, at 56; Chimni, supra note 2, at 13; Gallindo and Yip, supra note 2, at 269; Roberts, 
supra note 2, at 769. 
23  Okubuiro, supra note 2, at 237; Chimni, supra note 2, at 29. 
24  Okubuiro, supra note 2, at 238. 
25  Chimni, supra note 2, at 29. 
26  Gallindo and Yip, supra note 2, at 264. 
27  Kelly, supra note 2, at 56-59. 
28  Kelly, supra note 2, at 59-73. 
29  Patrick Juillard, ‘Calvo Doctrine/Calvo Clause’ (January 2007) MPEPIL  
< https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e689> accessed 15 
May 2019. 
30  Kelly, supra note 2, at 66. 
31  Ibid, 65. 
32  Ibid, 66-67. 
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pronged. Firstly, authors claim that CIL reflects the past because it is the outcome of the colonial 
encounter between Western European powers and the Third World.33 This arguments is based on the 
historical development of CIL as a source of international law, and traces the origins of CIL in the 
writings of Francisco de Vitoria who used the construct of universal reason to argue that non-European 
societies were bound by universal principles without their consent or participation. Thus, a survey of 
the origins of CIL reveals a universalization of European norms through legal rhetoric for the purpose 
of legitimizing the colonial enterprise, and later treating these norms as customary law binding on all.34 
As the reader may notice, this argument bears similarities with the above discussed criticism of CIL as 
a hegemonic structure, and in fact some authors have used CIL’s colonial history as a constitutive 
element of the hegemony critique.35 An interesting example supporting this line of criticism comes from 
Okubuiro’s analysis of uti possidetis in the context of the decolonization of Africa.36 While the principle 
of uti possidetis originates in Roman Law and was initially limited to the context of post-colonial 
boundary delimitation in Latin America, it re-surfaced in the 20th century to delimit boundaries in the 
decolonization of African States as well.37 In this context, reliance on uti possidetis saw the gathering 
of different African entities into larger groups pursuant to the Western model of statehood, and this 
model of delimitation remained in place in the decolonization period. . This sort of boundary 
delimitation Okubuior argues, maintained colonial frontiers in the region, and neglected important 
elements of local culture and organization. Far from showing resistance, many of the post-colonial 
States accepted this model of delimitation, thereby maintaining a model of statehood which excluded 
the consideration of diverse local communities. 38 Moreover, this reliance on uti possidetis led to a 
number of border disputes in the post-colonial period, including the 1986 Frontier Dispute case brought 
before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) by Burkina Faso and Mali, as well as the 1994 Land and 
Maritime Boundary case brought before the ICJ by Cameroon and Nigeria. While one might argue that 
the acquiescence to this model of delimitation by post-colonial States lends it some legitimacy, 
Okubuiro’s analysis of uti posidetis provides significant insight into the criticism that CIL reflects past 
realities. Her criticism of the application of uti posidetis in the context of African States traces back to 
the initial colonial delimitation of borders in the region, and stretches over the subsequent acquiescence 
to the principle by post-colonial state entities as well. Thus, her analysis offers a reading of the CIL rule 
which sheds light on the reasons why Third World scholars forward the criticism that CIL reflects past 
realities rather than more contemporary developments.    
Secondly, authors develop this criticism as a claim that CIL is biased towards the status quo and does 
not allow for evolution of international law. Since CIL rules develop from a general practice of 
international society, CIL crystalizes past realities and not proposed reforms.39 Even if a state disagrees 
with an existing CIL rule it is bound to comply with it, since deviations will be considered as an 
unlawful act unless and until they become accepted as a new custom. This process however is often 
long and uncertain, and judicial reasoning on this issue does not offer much clarity. In its Nicaragua 
judgment the ICJ alluded to the possibility of CIL modification by stating that “[r]eliance by a State on 
a novel right or an unprecedented exception to the principle might, if shared in principle by other States, 
 
33  Kelly, supra note 2, at 50; Anthony Angie “Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law” 
(CUP 2007). 
34  Kelly, supra note 2, at 51. 
35  Okubuiro, supra note 2; Chimni, supra note 2. 
36  Okubuiro, supra note 2, at 243-245. 
37  Giuseppe Nesi, ‘Uti possidetis Doctrine’ (February 2018) MPEPIL  
<https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1125?prd=EPIL> 
accessed 15 May 2019. 
38  Okubuiro, supra note 2, at 243. 
39  Gallindo and Yip, supra note 2, at 254-255. 
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tend towards a modification of customary international law”.40 This pronouncement however, as the 
reader will likely note, does not shed much light on the matter.  
 
2.3 The Formation and Application of CIL is Influenced by Powerful States 
This final category of criticism concerns the dominance of powerful States of the Global North in the 
contemporary formation and application of CIL. The criticism presented here broadly revolves around 
three elements of the current CIL system, namely: i) the dominance of first world practice for the 
purpose of identification of CIL, ii) the development of the persistent objector doctrine, and iii) the 
appropriation of the specially affected States doctrine by States of the Global North. 
The paper distinguishes this line of criticism from the one concerning CIL’s lack of democratic 
legitimacy mostly because this critique concerns what is arguably still present in the current CIL system, 
whereas the previous one concerned itself with the historical development of CIL. Nonetheless, the 
reader will notice that often the points raised by both critiques relate to one another.  
With respect to the dominance of first world practice for the purpose of CIL identification, in addition 
to the above-identified argument concerning CIL’s undemocratic origins, authors maintain that even in 
the present practice of CIL formation and identification the practice of powerful western States 
predominates.41 This is ascribed to several factors. Firstly, it is related to the different degree of publicity 
and availability of evidence of state practice. Both international courts and scholars can more easily 
obtain documents attesting to the practice of western States than to that of States of the Third World.42 
This leads to the identification of CIL rules based primarily or even exclusively on the practice of 
powerful western States.43 Furthermore, authors forward the claim that beyond issues of availability, 
international courts consider state practice selectively, with a bias towards the practice of a few powerful 
States.44 Here an example can be found in the analysis of state practice by the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant 
case,  where the practice of only a couple of States was considered for the purpose of establishing 
whether there exists under CIL any form of exception to the rule according immunity from criminal 
jurisdiction and inviolability to incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs.45 While one of the parties to 
the dispute also pointed to the absence of practice of prosecution of incumbent ministers as a potential 
indication of state practice through abstention,46 the Court did not evaluate this argument explicitly. 
This might be owed to the fact that it is difficult to infer evidence of state practice only from the absence 
of behaviour on the part of a state, and indeed the International Law Commission (ILC) has recently 
indicated that abstention may count towards practice only under certain circumstances.47 In any event, 
 
40  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) 
(Merits Judgment) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, para. 207. 
41  Gallindo and Yip, supra note 2, at 258; Roberts, supra note 2, at 768. 
42  Gallindo and Yip, supra note 2, at 258. 
43  Chimni, supra note 2, at 20-22. 
44  Roberts, supra note 2, at 768; Kelly, supra note 2, at 64; Niels Petersen ‘The International Court of Justice 
and the Judicial Politics of Identifying Customary International Law’ [2017] EJIL 28(2) 375, 377. 
45  Case concerning the Arrest Warrant of 1 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) 
(Judgment) [2002] ICJ Rep. 3, para. 58. 
46  Case concerning the Arrest Warrant of 1 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) 
Memorial of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, para. 67. 
47  International Law Commission, Draft conclusion on identification of customary international law, with 
commentaries (Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2018, vol. II, Part Two) Conclusion 16. 
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in this case the Court did not go into great detail when analysing the relevant CIL rule, and provided a 
rather brief analysis with respect to the relevant state practice.   
The second criticism that emerges in this category is the one concerning the development of the 
persistent objector doctrine. While the ‘persistent objector’ has now been recognized as a part of the 
CIL system by both the ILC48 and the ILA,49 a historical survey shows that the doctrine only emerged 
in jurisprudence as early as the 1950s,50 and was widely accepted in scholarly work in the 1970s and 
1980s.51 This has led authors to argue that rather than being a legally sound element of CIL theory, the 
persistent objector was developed as tool of western counter-reformation in response to the increasing 
participation of newly independent Third World States in international law.52 Thus, while newly 
independent States were bound by existing CIL, developed States could, by resorting to persistent 
objection, opt out of any new or modified CIL rules.53 
A final criticism in this category is what authors have characterized as an appropriation of the specially 
affected States doctrine by powerful States. Authors which view the doctrine of specially affected States 
with a critical eye, argue that in addition to the already identified dominance of developed States 
practice in CIL, the ability of Third World States to contribute to the formation or modification of CIL 
is further undermined by the specially affected States doctrine.54 This is owed to the fact that while the 
doctrine itself does not proclaim any bias towards particular States, its application has largely 
contributed to furthering the grip of powerful States over CIL.55 In a persuasive twist of the argument 
however, Kevin Jon Heller convincingly illustrates that while there has indeed been an appropriation of 
the specially affected States doctrine by powerful States (and in particular the US), this misuse of the 
doctrine is based on the erroneous views that engaging in a non-universal practice makes a state 
specially affected and that CIL cannot be formed over the objection of one specially affected state.56 
Thus, while the criticism on the application of the specially affected States doctrine still stands, this is 
an area of Third World States’ grievance which can be particularly addressed with the development of 
guidelines for CIL interpretation.  
 
3. What’s Interpretation got to do with it?  
The previous section explored the criticism that developed around the issue of under-representation of 
Third World States in the development and functioning of CIL. This following section turns to a 
discussion of the interpretation of CIL and develops the argument that the issues identified in the 
criticism can be addressed through the development of uniform guidelines for the interpretation of CIL. 
Notably, this section forwards the view that uniform guidelines of interpretation carry the potential to 
democratize CIL and provide the opportunity for customary rules to evolve through the process of 
interpretation.  
 
48  Ibid. Conclusion 15. 
49  ILA Report (n 20).  
50  Asylum case (Colombia v. Peru) (Judgment of November 20th 1950) [1950] ICJ Rep 266; Fisheries case 
(United Kingdom v. Norway) (Judgment of December 18th 1951) ICJ Rep. 116. 
51  Gallindo and Yip, supra note 2, at 267; Kelly, supra note 2, at 78-79. 
52  Chimni, supra note 2, at 24; Gallindo and Yip, supra note 2, at 267-268. 
53  Kelly, supra note 2, at 79. 
54  Chimni, supra note 2, at 6. 
55  Ibid. 22-23. 
56  Heller, supra note 14, at 193. 
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At this point it must be noted that the view that interpretation may address some, if not all, of the 
criticisms levied from the Third World perspective is not entirely unique to this paper. In her analysis 
of traditional and modern approaches to CIL, Anthea Roberts introduces the concept of a ‘reflective 
interpretive approach’ as a means of adequately dealing with the fluid nature of custom and reconciling 
traditional and modern approaches to its genesis and application.57 Similarly, in his analysis of the 
specially affected States doctrine, Kevin Jon Heller argues that an appropriate interpretation of the 
doctrine has the potential to provide Third World States with more power over the formation of 
international custom.58 The argument developed in the present paper builds on these observations, and 
takes the potential of CIL interpretation to address deficiencies in the current CIL theory even further. 
Moreover, unlike other authors dealing with CIL interpretation, the argument developed in this paper 
focuses on interpretation after a CIL norm has been formed and identified. In this sense, the argument 
does not attempt to propose new theories on the genesis and functioning of CIL, but rather attempts to 
address some of its deficiencies in the stage of CIL application.  
Before developing this argument however, it is necessary to dedicate a few paragraphs on the possibility 
to interpret CIL and the current state of affairs with respect to that matter. For this reason, this section 
begins by elaborating on the current status of CIL interpretation and the model of interpretation 
proposed by this paper. The section then delves into the argument that a set of guidelines for the 
interpretation of CIL have the potential to bridge the proverbial gap currently existing in the field of 
CIL with respect to the Third World.   
 
3.1 Can CIL be Interpreted? 
In the current academic discourse on the application of CIL, there is as of yet an unresolved question 
asking whether customary law is open to interpretation. Unlike treaties, whose interpretation is guided 
by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) and its customary counterparts, CIL’s 
interpretation remains a mysterious process whose functioning is both questioned and unregulated.  
The main reason authors question the interpretability of CIL is its unwritten nature. In an analysis of 
CIL as a source of international law, Judge Tulio Treves argues that the unwritten character of CIL 
excludes the need for its interpretation; thereinafter, when discussing the work of international courts, 
he differentiates between the process of ascertaining when it comes to CIL versus the process of 
interpreting when it comes to written sources.59 Similarly, Maarten Bos argues that interpretation does 
not extend to unwritten sources like CIL because the mere process of identification of a CIL rule 
delineates its content as well.60 This is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, as has been persuasively 
demonstrated by Panos Merkouris in his analysis of the interpretability of CIL, international 
jurisprudence negates this position by regularly engaging in the process of CIL interpretation separately 
from the process of identifying CIL through the ‘state practice + opinio juris’ formula.61 This 
engagement varies from explicit recognition by judges that they are interpreting CIL,62 to more implicit 
 
57  Roberts, supra note 2, at 786-791. 
58  Heller, supra note 14, at 241-243. 
59  Tulio Treves “Customary International Law” (Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law 2010). 
60  Maarten Bos “A Methodology of International Law” (Oxford: North Holland, 1984). 
61  Panos Merkouris “Article 31(3)(c) VCLT and the Principle of Systemic Integration: Normative Shadows in 
Plato’s Cave (Brill Nijhoff, 2015) 240-263. 
62  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) 
(Merits Judgment) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, para.178; North Sea Continental Shelf cases (Federal Republic of 
Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands) [1969] ICJ Rep. 172, Dissenting Opinion 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3513261
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3513261 
ESIL CONFERENCE PAPER SERIES  [VOL. 13 NO.11]  
10 
 
examples where although judges do not outright use the term ‘interpretation’ this is what is taking 
place.63 Secondly, and more substantially, in the absence of an interpretative process for a CIL rule, 
there is no explanation about what happens to a CIL rule after it has been identified. Namely, once a 
CIL rule is identified for the first time through a judicial assessment of the two elements of state practice 
and opinio juris, it is reasonable to assume that in subsequent cases judges will not need to re-asses 
these elements in order to identify the rule once again, but will rather need to apply the rule to the case 
at hand and interpret it within the given legal and factual context. Arguing that CIL is not subject to 
interpretation thus fails to account for the continued existence and operation of a CIL rule after its first 
identification, and rather operates from the paradoxical premise that a rule of CIL should be identified 
each and every time anew. Furthermore, several authors have successfully illustrated that CIL is 
regularly interpreted by international courts and tribunals,64 and that international legal theory more 
generally allows for this kind of interpretation.65 
This paper accounts for the process of CIL interpretation through the illustrative tool of a ‘CIL timeline’ 
(Figure 1). The CIL timeline begins with the formation of a customary rule through the two constitutive 
elements of state practice and opinio juris. The rule is then identified by an inductive analysis of these 
two elements, usually by a relevant judicial authority. For the purposes of identification, evidence of 
state practice and opinio juris is considered, weighed, and evaluated in order to establish whether a 
customary rule has come into existence. It is important to note that a form of interpretation also takes 
place at this phase of identification. However, at this phase the relevant judicial authority does not 
interpret a customary rule (as this rule has not been identified yet) but rather interprets the evidence of 
state practice and opinio juris in order to ascertain whether a customary rule has been formed. This 
distinction is particularly important for the purposes of the present discussion, because, when speaking 
of interpretation, this paper refers not to the evaluation of state practice and opinio juris for the purpose 
of identification, but rather to the interpretation of an already identified CIL rule. In this context, 
interpretation of state practice may take two different forms: i) an evaluation of whether an instance of 
state behaviour may count for the purposes of CIL identification, or ii) a qualification of state practice 
when determining if it is consistent, uniform, widespread and representative. Interpretation of a CIL 
rule, on the other hand, is what this paper consider to be the ‘true’ question of interpretation, arising 
with regard to an already identified customary rule the content of which is unclear. Once it is established 
that a CIL rule has emerged, every subsequent invocation of that rule in following cases is not an 
exercise of re-identification (as shown above by reference to both jurisprudence and scholarly analysis) 
but rather of application and, where the content of the rule is unclear, interpretation. In this vein, it is 
important to note that the distinction between application and interpretations raised here differentiates 
the two by accounting for interpretation as the process of determining the meaning of a rule, and 
 
of Judge Tanaka; Prosecutor v. Enver Hadzihasanovic, Mehmed Alagic and Amir Kubura (Decision on 
Interlocutory Appeal challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility) IT-01-47-AR72 (16 
July 2003) Partial Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen paras 9-10. For an interesting example of CIL 
interpretation by national courts, see Committee against Torture in Israel and Palestine v Israel, Supreme 
Court of Justice of Israel (2006) para. 27.  
63  Case concerning the Arrest Warrant of 1 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) 
(Judgment) [2002] ICJ Rep. 3, para. 53-54; WTO, EC — Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products – 
Reports of the Panel (29 September 2006) WT/DS291/R paras. 7.68-7.72; Mondev International Ltd. v. 
United States of America (Final Award, 2002) ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2 para. 113. 
64  See A. Orakhelashvili, The Interpretation of Acts and Rules in Public International Law (Oxford University 
Press 2008) Chapter 15; Merkouris, supra note 61, at 231-298. 
65  See S Talmon, Determining Customary International Law: The ICJ’s Methodology between Induction, 
Deduction and Assertion (The European Journal of International Law Vol. 26(2), 2015) 417-443; P 
Merkouris, Interpreting the Customary Rules on Interpretation (International Community Law Review 19, 
2017) 126-155. 
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application as the process of determining the consequences which follow from the rule in a given 
situation. Thus, interpretation might not take place in instances where a CIL rule is sufficiently clear 
for the given circumstances. Nonetheless, where the content of a CIL rule is unclear, interpretation will 
need to take place before the legal consequences of the rule may be determined. 
The current CIL timeline does not have explicit rules which guide the phase of interpretation. 
Nonetheless, in its 2016 Preliminary Report of the Study Group on Content and Evolution of the Rules 
of Interpretation, the ILA flagged CIL interpretation as a relevant topic of exploration.66 Similarly, there 
is currently a large-scale project dedicated to the research and identification of the rules of CIL 
interpretation.67 While an in-depth study of rules for CIL interpretation is beyond the scope of this paper, 
it is relevant to delineate this phase in the timeline of a CIL rule, before continuing to illustrate how the 
identification of such rules holds the potential to address the Third World criticism. A final phase 
depicted on the CIL timeline is the modification of a CIL rule. It is important to point out that this is 
not a necessary phase in the timeline of every CIL rule, and it may well happen that a CIL rule continues 
its existence without being subject to modification. Nonetheless, in case where a customary rule goes 




Figure 1: The CIL Timeline 
 
Overall, while there are scholars who question or negate the interpretability of CIL, this is not the view 
that dominates the discourse.68 In addition to authors who have engaged in a detailed demonstration of 
the interpretability of CIL, many authors have referenced the interpretation of custom passingly, 
seeming to accept that this is but a regular event in the application of CIL.69 Moreover, as has already 
been indicated above, some authors have even looked to CIL interpretation as the process which may 
address the many issues that exist in the current CIL system with respect to the under-representation of 
Third World States’ interests and practice.70  
 
 
66  International Law Association Study Group on Content and Evolution of the Rules of Interpretation, 
‘Preliminary Report’ (Johannesburg, 2016) 9 
67  See the TRICI-Law project, of which the author is a member. 
68  Merkouris, supra note 61, at 243-246. See also H. Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by 
the International Court (Stevens and Sons Ltd., 1958) 381-384; Orakhelashvili, supra note 64, Chapter 15; 
Talmon, supra note 65, at 417-443.   
69  See indicatively Lauterpacht, supra note 68, at 381-384 and Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: 
the Structure of International Legal Argument (CUP 2005) 391. 
70  Roberts, supra note 2, at 786-791; Heller, supra note 14, at 241-243. 
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3.2 How does CIL Interpretation address the Third World critique? 
Having explored the interpretability of CIL and the phase in a CIL timeline when we engage in 
interpretation, this paper now turns to the argument that the criticisms concerning the current position 
of Third World States in the CIL system may be addressed through the development of uniform 
guidelines for the interpretation of CIL. More specifically, the paper argues that a consistent practice of 
CIL interpretation after the formation and identification of a CIL rule may offer an approach which 
addresses the lack of democratic legitimacy of CIL, CIL’s bias towards the status quo, and the 
dominance by powerful States in the formation and application of CIL. Interpretation may thus offer an 
answer to these critiques by: 
i) Enhancing uniformity in the application of CIL; 
ii) Offering a solution to the critique of dominance by laying out uniform guidelines for 
the interpretation and application of CIL; and  
iii) Providing an opportunity for CIL rules to evolve through the process of interpretation. 
Beginning with point (i), this paper argues that the development of guidelines for CIL interpretation 
will enhance uniformity in the application of CIL, by relying on an analogy to the interpretation of 
treaties after the adoption of the VCLT. In its 2018 interim report, the ILA Study Group on the Content 
and Evolution of the Rules of Interpretation provides an overview of interpretive practices of various 
international tribunals and judicial bodies, focusing on the reception and effect of the VCLT rules on 
the process of treaty interpretation. In the case of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the report 
notes that the Court has developed a consistent tendency to refer to the VCLT rules when engaging in 
interpretation.71 While the Court does on event also rely on interpretive principles not explicitly 
mentioned in the VCLT, in such instances it tends to stress the principles’ supplementary nature or their 
subsumption by the VCLT rules.72 A similar and even more explicit tendency is visible in the practice 
of the World Trade Organization Appellate Body (WTO AB), where the interpretive process is guided 
by Article 3.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, which contains a reference to customary rules 
of interpretation of public international law. Article 3.2 has been interpreted as implicitly referencing 
VCLT rules, and the AB has indeed referred to the VCLT rules of interpretation  both in its first decision 
and in subsequent decisions.73 This continued reference to VCLT rules of interpretation has led 
commentators to observe that the WTO AB has developed a fairly consistent body of jurisprudence 
concerning interpretation.74 Similar observations on the increase in consistency post-VCLT, albeit to a 
lesser degree, are made with respect to the interpretive practices of ad-hoc tribunals75 and the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS).76 The relevance of these findings cannot be 
overstated. While the observations by the ILA on the consistency of interpretation post-VCLT pertains 
to the interpretation of treaties, these findings may be analogized to the interpretation of CIL post an 
identification and development of guidelines for CIL interpretation. Thus, the patterns of consistency 
identified by the ILA report in the case of treaties, may also be expected in the interpretation of CIL if 
relevant guidelines for its interpretation are identified and applied.  
 
71  ILA Study Group on the Content and Evolution of the Rules of Interpretation, ‘Interim Report – 19-24 
August 2018, Sudney’ [2018] 5. 
72  Ibid, 6. 
73  Ibid.  
74  Helen Ruiz Fabri and Joel Trachtman, ‘Preliminary Report on the Jurisprudence of the WTO DSBS’, 
prepared for the purposes of ILA Report 2018, supra note 71.  
75  ILA Report 2018, supra note 71, at 6-7. 
76  Ibid, 8-9. 
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Before continuing with this argument, it is important to note that the paper does not argue that CIL 
should be interpreted by reliance on the VCLT rules of interpretation (Art. 31-33). To the contrary, the 
author is of the view that when it comes to CIL, as a distinct source of international law, a separate set 
of guidelines should be identified for the interpretive process. These guidelines may or may not 
resemble some of the interpretive approaches enshrined in the VCLT, but they would nonetheless be 
separate to CIL interpretation. The reference to treaty interpretation after the adoption of the VCLT is 
made with the aim of illustrating that the process of treaty interpretation became notably more consistent 
and uniform post-VCLT, and thus a similar development may be expected in the case of CIL if rules 
for its interpretation are identified and developed.  
In an analysis of universality and fragmentation in international law, Judge Bruno Simma points out 
consistent interpretation as one of the methods to be used to counteract the negative effects of 
fragmentation.77 Moreover, he flags the importance of consistent interpretation by both international 
and domestic courts; in the case of international courts because they act within an overarching 
framework of international law, and in the case of domestic courts because they play an increasingly 
relevant role in the formation and application of international law.78 Here again we may draw an analogy 
to the interpretation of CIL after the identification and development of rules for its interpretation. As is 
illustrated by the ILA report with respect to treaties, the existence of guidelines for interpretation 
contributes to a consistency of interpretation and application across various tribunals. Analogizing this 
to the case of CIL, it may be expected that a similar consistency of interpretation and application across 
various tribunals will ensue if guidelines for CIL interpretation are identified and developed. Thus, a 
consistent approach in the interpretation of CIL, ensured by means of guidelines for its interpretation, 
carries the potential to provide greater uniformity in CIL’s application. This in turn directly addresses 
the criticism levied from the Third World perspective that the application of CIL is still predominantly 
influenced by powerful States. While consistent rules for CIL interpretation do not automatically 
address all the aspects of the dominance critique, their existence offers assurance that the process of 
interpretation will become more uniform and transparent. Thus, by providing for uniformity in the 
interpretation of CIL, the rules of interpretation significantly enhance uniformity in how CIL is applied 
by international courts, as well as how it is seen to be applied by States involved in the proceedings.   
Moreover, and leading into point (ii), the existence of rules for CIL interpretation which would be 
applied consistently by judicial authorities when engaging with CIL, enables a strong degree of legal 
certainty for States arguing cases on the basis of CIL. By knowing the rules of interpretation, States 
may have reasonable foresight into the interpretation and application of a CIL rule to the case they are 
arguing. This in turn levels the proverbial playing field, and holds the potential to address the negatively 
perceived dominance of powerful States over CIL. Looking back to the interpretive jurisprudence of 
the WTO, commentators have noted that in the post-VCLT period the AB developed a trend of 
describing its interpretive reasoning in detail by reference to the VCLT rules.79 While this tendency of 
describing their interpretive reasoning is noticeable to a lesser degree in the jurisprudence of other 
judicial bodies (even after the adoption of the VCLT),80 there is an argument to be made that the 
presence of clear rules of interpretation enables judicial bodies to provide a clearer and more explicit 
account of their interpretive reasoning. This allows for a great degree of transparency and clarity of the 
 
77  Bruno Simma ‘Universality of International Law from the Perspective of a Practitioner’ [2009] 20(2) EJIL 
265, 270-271. 
78  Ibid, 271. 
79  Fabri and Trachtman, supra note 74.  
80  ILA Report 2018, supra note 71.  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3513261
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3513261 
ESIL CONFERENCE PAPER SERIES  [VOL. 13 NO.11]  
14 
 
interpretive process, which further strengthens the potential of interpretation to address the dominance 
critique.  
Turning finally to point (iii), this paper argues that the development of uniform guidelines for the 
interpretation of CIL will provide the opportunity for CIL to evolve through interpretation, thereby 
addressing the criticism that CIL reflects only past realities and not proposed reforms. The process of 
custom evolution and modification is presently still quite obscure. The general approach seems to 
indicate that a CIL rule may evolve or be modified by a subsequent breach of that rule by a state, which, 
if met with agreement by other States, will be perceived as a move towards a new or modified rule 
rather than a breach.81  
The role of interpretation and the rules for interpretation in this process is twofold. Firstly, interpretation 
enables a CIL rule to evolve or be modified through the medium of evolutive interpretation. Evolutive 
interpretation covers situations in which an interpretive authority interprets a term or a legal obligation 
as having a meaning or content capable of evolving,82 and this type of interpretation can occur in 
instances of evolution of fact or evolution of law.83 This form of interpretation is thus particularly 
sensitive to changes in the legal system, and enables rules to respond to the relevant changes 
accordingly. This directly addresses the criticism that CIL reflects past realities and is biased towards 
the status quo. Moreover, this form of interpretation enables Third World countries to actively 
contribute to the evolution of CIL through subsequent practice. Secondly, the rules of interpretation 
ensure that the evolution or modification of a CIL rule is kept within strictly delineated parameters and 
does not assume unreasonable directions. Relying on the analogy to treaty interpretation once again, 
while evolutive interpretation may lead to a broad spectrum of changes, the rules contained in the VCLT 
delineate the parameters in which it may take place. Thus, scholars maintain that evolutive interpretation 
may happen on the bases of the intention of the parties,84 the object and purpose of the instrument being 
interpreted,85 or the language used,86 all of which reflect the parameters outlined in Art. 31 VCLT. In 
this sense, evolutive interpretation is not a carte blanche to interpret legal provisions unreasonably 
expansively, but is a process delineated by the relevant rules of interpretation. Similarly, the rules for 
CIL interpretation would serve the purpose of delineating the parameters in which a CIL rule may be 
considered to have evolved, once again ensuring consistency in the interpretive process. This would 
allow for CIL rules to evolve in response to changes of law or fact, while at the same time ensuring that 
no unreasonably expansive interpretation takes place.  
 
 
81  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) 
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Rica v Nicaragua) (Judgment) [2009] ICJ Rep 213. 
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Endure, Perdure or Exdure?’ [2014] 45 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 121, 139-140. 
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This paper surveyed the scholarly criticism of the current system of CIL from the perspective of Third 
World States and examined how some of the points of criticism may be addressed through the 
development of uniform guidelines for the interpretation of CIL.  
Section one illustrated that in the current academic discourse there exists a substantive amount of 
criticism towards the current CIL system from the perspective of Third World States. This criticism 
concerns both the origins of CIL and its continued operation. Section two then turned to a discussion of 
CIL interpretation, in an attempt to identify novel approaches which may address the criticism identified 
in section one. Here, the paper illustrated that in spite of some scholarly disagreement, CIL 
interpretation regularly takes place in different international adjudicatory fora. Unlike the interpretation 
of treaties however, the process is presently unregulated and therefore inherently unclear and obscure. 
In light of these findings, the paper advanced the argument that some of the criticism of the current CIL 
system may be addressed through the identification and development of guidelines for the interpretation 
of CIL.  
The development of guidelines for the interpretation of CIL carries the potential to bring the CIL 
interpretive exercise out into the light, and address many of the issues of the present CIL system raised 
from the Third World perspective. While guidelines for interpretation may not be a “catch-all” solution, 
they offer the potential to address the criticism by enhancing uniformity and transparency in the way 
CIL is applied and interpreted, as well as by providing an opportunity for CIL to develop and respond 
to changes through the medium of evolutive interpretation. In this way, the development of uniform 
guidelines for interpretation has the potential to enable the meaningful participation of all States in the 
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